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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
 This appeal concerns important questions of constitutional law and federal 
preemption: whether the district court erred in preliminarily enjoining portions of 
S.B. 7072, Florida’s first-of-its-kind law to protect consumers from arbitrary 
censorship by social media platforms, because of limitations imposed by the First 
Amendment and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. This Court’s 
answer to these questions will have far reaching effects in determining whether and 
how the State can regulate these platforms and their unprecedented power over the 
free flow of information and ideas in the United States. Appellants believe oral 
argument would assist the Court in deciding the consequential issues presented by 
this appeal.   
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 Over the last fifteen years, social media has transformed how Americans 
express themselves and consume information. The rise of this new medium of 
communication has enabled individual speakers to reach audiences directly and on 
a scale that was never before possible. But this development has also led to an 
unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of a few company executives, as 
network effects prompt an ever-growing number of users to assemble on a handful 
of dominant platforms.  
 Large media companies with the power to influence public debate are nothing 
new. But what makes social media platforms different is their ability to shape public 
discourse not by promoting their own messages but by silencing voices they deem 
to be harmful. Unlike traditional newspapers, social media companies generally run 
their platforms to provide a conduit for the speech of others, and the bottleneck 
position that comes with control of these platforms brings with it a remarkable power 
to censor. From preventing the distribution of contested claims about COVID-19 to 
suppressing news coverage of the business dealings of the President’s son, the 
platforms have, in recent months, exhibited a growing willingness to exercise this 
power. Whether and how such power ought to be regulated is among the most 
consequential and controversial policy issues in America today.  
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 The plaintiffs in this case are two trade associations for social media platforms 
that want the courts to shut down the policy debate over this issue. In Plaintiffs’ 
view, the First Amendment and a federal statute passed more than a decade before 
the platforms began their incredible rise, Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, leave the States with no choice but to stand by and hope the platforms 
will exercise their unprecedented censorship power wisely. Florida disagrees, and 
passed S.B. 7072 to protect its consumers from arbitrary censorship. Nonetheless, 
the District Court accepted Plaintiffs’ meager view of state power and enjoined much 
of Florida’s law. But, “[t]he First Amendment’s command that the government not 
impede the freedom of speech does not disable the government from taking steps to 
ensure that private interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical 
pathway of communication, the free flow of information and ideas.” Turner 
Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 657 (1994). Florida’s law is consistent with 
Section 230 as well as the First Amendment, and the injunction should be reversed. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The District Court 
entered the preliminary injunction on June 30, 2021. Defendants filed a timely notice 
of appeal on July 12, 2021. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether, in a pre-enforcement facial challenge, Plaintiffs have 
established a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that 47 U.S.C. § 230 
preempts all possible applications of S.B. 7072. 
2. Whether Plaintiffs, in a pre-enforcement facial challenge, have 
established a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that S.B. 7072 violates 
the First Amendment. 
3. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in determining that 
irreparable injury, the balance of hardships, and the public interest weighed in favor 
of issuing a preliminary injunction against enforcement of S.B. 7072. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
I. Social Media Platforms’ Efforts To Limit Public Discourse.  
 
The record in this appeal leaves no question that social media platforms 
arbitrarily discriminate against disfavored speakers, including speakers in Florida. 
The record is replete with unrebutted examples of platforms suppressing user content 
for arbitrary reasons. E.g., App.891 (Doc.106-1 at 802) (Facebook censoring The 
Babylon Bee, a Florida-based media company, for obviously satirical content). 
When caught, platforms frequently cast these decisions off as “mistakes.” E.g., 
App.1693 (Doc.106-5 at 201). But systematic examinations show that platforms 
apply their content standards differently to content and speakers that express 
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different views but are otherwise similarly situated, all while publicly claiming to 
apply those standards fairly. See App.999, 1007, 1183 (Doc.106-2 at 14, 22; 
Doc.106-3 at 17). There are many examples in the Appendix, and even that list is 
hardly exhaustive. 
II. Senate Bill 7072. 
 
Undoubtedly, social media is “the modern public square.” Packingham v. 
North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). In S.B. 7072 (the “Act”), Florida has 
taken the lead in preventing “social media platforms”1 from abusing their power over 
the public square. The Act does this by mandating disclosure to ensure that 
consumers know and understand how platforms regulate speech. Accordingly, the 
Act requires covered platforms to “publish the standards . . . used for determining 
how to censor, deplatform, and shadow ban.” FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(a).2 And 
 
1 The Act defines “social media platform” as “any information service, 
system, Internet search engine, or access software provider” that, among other 
things, “enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,” “[d]oes 
business in the state,” and has either “annual gross revenues in excess of $100 
million” or “at least 100 million monthly individual platform participants globally.” 
FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(g). The District Court erroneously posited that this 
definition “also applies to systems nobody would refer to as social media.” App.1700 
(Doc.113 at 5). But even if the District Court was right, it correctly observed that 
this issue “makes no difference” to the questions presented here. Id. 
2 The Act defines “censor” as “any action taken by a social media platform to 
delete, regulate, restrict, edit, alter, inhibit the publication or republication of, 
suspend a right to post, remove, or post an addendum to any content or material 
posted by a user. The term also includes actions to inhibit the ability of a user to be 
viewable by or to interact with another user of the social media platform.” 
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platforms are required to notify users when censoring, deplatforming, or shadow 
banning users or their posts, id. § 501.2041(2)(d)(1). Platforms must also inform 
users of forthcoming changes to “user rules, terms, and agreements,” which may not 
be made more than once every 30 days. Id. § 501.2041(2)(c). And Platforms must 
allow users to see how many other users have viewed their posts, so that users can 
determine for themselves whether they have been censored or shadow banned. Id. 
§ 501.2041(2)(e).  
Related to all this disclosure, the Act requires that platforms apply their own 
content moderation rules consistently. This ensures that the disclosed rules are 
actually the rules applied by the platforms. Under the Act, a platform is generally 
free to adopt content- and viewpoint-discriminatory standards. It simply must apply 
whatever censorship, deplatforming, and shadow banning standards it adopts “in a 
consistent manner among its users.” Id. § 501.2041(2)(b). 
In general, the “hosting” function of social media platforms entails storing 
posts on a platform and distributing those posts to other users who affirmatively seek 
them out. Thus, when a social media platform provides users the ability to have their 
 
Deplatform “means the action or practice by a social media platform to permanently 
delete or ban a user or to temporarily delete or ban a user from the social media 
platform for more than 14 days.” And shadow ban “means action by a social media 
platform, through any means, whether the action is determined by a natural person 
or an algorithm, to limit or eliminate the exposure of a user or content or material 
posted by a user to other users of the social media platform.” See FLA. STAT. 
§ 501.2041(1)(b), (c), (f). 
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own pages or own feeds, the platform is serving as a host to users’ posts. For 
instance, a user can post her speeches, her photos, and her videos to her Facebook 
page, and other users can visit her page. The Act restricts platform control over these 
“hosting” functions for users likely to have uniquely important contributions to the 
public square—qualified political candidates and journalistic enterprises. In 
particular, the Act provides that platforms “may not willfully deplatform” users who 
are qualified candidates for political office in Florida. Id. § 106.072(2). Platforms 
also may not deplatform a “journalistic enterprise based on the content of its 
publication or broadcast,” with “journalistic enterprise” defined based on, among 
other things, the number of words or other content the entity publishes and the 
number of viewers or subscribers it receives. Id. § 501.2041(1)(d), (2)(j).  
Finally, to ensure that these “hosting” provisions are effective, and that 
journalistic enterprises remain free to communicate on a platform, the Act prohibits 
censorship and shadow banning of journalistic enterprises based on what they say, 
id. § 501.2041(1)(d), (2)(j), and ensures that qualified candidates remain visible by 
prohibiting the use of algorithms to shadow ban material posted by or about 
candidates during the campaign, id. § 501.2041(2)(h).3 
 
3 The Act also regulates “post prioritization.” But, as explained below, issues 
raised by those provisions are ill-suited to resolution on this preliminary record, and 
therefore, Defendants do not challenge the injunction as to them at this stage.  
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III. Procedural History. 
Plaintiffs—two associations of internet companies, see App.34 (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 20 
n.23, 32–34—challenged S.B. 7072 days after it was enacted and before it was 
scheduled to take effect. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that they 
were likely to succeed on three of their several claims, namely that S.B. 7072 is 
preempted by Section 230, violates the First Amendment, and is unconstitutionally 
vague. See Doc.30 at 18–49. Leaving little time for discovery, the District Court 
required a response to the preliminary injunction motion in about two weeks. It held 
a hearing on the motion a week later. Two days later, the District Court enjoined 
Defendants from enforcing any provision of §§ 106.072 or 501.2041 on preemption 
and First Amendment grounds. See App.1725 (Doc. 113 at 30). Defendants timely 
appealed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“In this Circuit, a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic 
remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the burden of 
persuasion as to each of the four prerequisites.” Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 
1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted). Those prerequisites are that 
“(1) [the movant] has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) it will 
suffer an irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted; (3) the harm from the 
threatened injury outweighs the harm the injunction would cause the opposing party; 
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and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Gonzalez v. 
Governor of Ga., 978 F.3d 1266, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 2020). This Court “review[s] 
the grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion,” and “any underlying 
legal conclusions de novo.” Id. at 1270. “A district court abuses its discretion if it 
applies an incorrect legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect 
manner, . . . or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation 
marks omitted).  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that any 
provision of the Act is facially preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 230. As the District Court 
tacitly acknowledged, the only part of that statute that could possibly preempt the 
Act is Section 230(c)(2). But that provision serves only to absolve platforms of 
liability when they remove in good faith content that is “objectionable” within the 
meaning of Section 230(c)(2). That leaves myriad ways in which the Act can apply 
consistently with Section 230(c)(2). For example, the Act and Section 230 can 
peacefully coexist when a social media platform fails to act in “good faith,” when 
the Act does not regulate the removal or restriction of content, or when a platform 
removes unobjectionable material.  
II. Plaintiffs are also unlikely to succeed on their claim that the Act 
violates the First Amendment on its face. Most of the Act is directed at ensuring that 
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social media platforms host content in a transparent fashion. For example, the Act 
requires non-controversial, factual disclosures, and disclosure requirements have 
long coexisted with the First Amendment. Even the portions of the Act that regulate 
the manner in which platforms host speech are consistent with the First Amendment. 
When properly analyzed separately from the Act’s other provisions—and from the 
extraneous legislative statements on which the District Court primarily relied—these 
requirements parallel other hosting regulations that the Supreme Court has held are 
consistent with the First Amendment. E.g., Rumsfeld v. FAIR, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 63 
(2006). The Act’s hosting regulations prevent the platforms from silencing others. 
They leave platforms free to speak for themselves, create no risk that a user’s speech 
will be mistakenly attributed to the platforms, and intrude on no unified speech 
product of any platform. These requirements are little different from traditional 
regulation of common carriers that has long been thought consistent with the First 
Amendment.  
III. Even if Plaintiffs’ claims were likely to succeed against any of the Act’s 
provisions, the District Court’s wholesale injunction of enforcement of the Act 
would still be unjustified. Under the Act’s severability clause and under established 
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severability principles, any constitutional problems arising from a given provision 
would require enjoining enforcement of that provision, not the entire Act. 
IV. The other injunctive factors—irreparable injury, balance of the equities, 
and the public interest—also do not justify enjoining enforcement of the Act’s 
hosting regulations at this preliminary stage. These requirements neither curtail 
Plaintiffs’ speech nor prevent them from monitoring abuses of their platforms. 
Therefore, the only parties facing irreparable injury are the State of Florida and the 
Floridians whose interests the enjoined requirements serve. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiffs Are Unlikely To Succeed on the Merits of Their Claim that 
Section 230 Preempts the Act. 
 
In this “facial preemption challenge,” Plaintiffs bear “the burden to establish 
. . . that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.” 
NCTA -- The Internet & Television Ass’n v. Frey, 7 F.4th 1, at *12 (1st Cir. Aug. 3, 
2021); see also Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, 821 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 2016). 
Plaintiffs cannot carry that burden. Section 230 expressly preserves state regulatory 
power, and there are many circumstances when the Act can be applied consistently 
with Section 230. 
Section 230(c) offers “[p]rotection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and 
screening of offensive material.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). As relevant here, subsection 
(c)(1) states that “[n]o provider . . . of an interactive computer service” (including 
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platforms covered by S.B. 7072) “shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by” a user. Id. § 230(c)(1). Subsection (c)(2) states in turn that 
platforms may not “be held liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in 
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the [platform] considers 
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable.” Id. § 230(c)(2). 
As the District Court observed, Section 230 “does not preempt the field” of 
internet-content regulation. App.1710 (Doc.113 at 15). Congress expressly 
preserved states’ authority to “enforc[e] any State law that is consistent with” 
Section 230(c). 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). In conformity with that provision and the 
well-established presumption against preemption, the rest of Section 230 should be 
construed in a manner that allows federal and state law in this area to coexist.  
A. The District Court’s error begins with a fundamental misunderstanding 
of Section 230. To the District Court, subsection 230(c)(2) preempts any state law 
that regulates a “social media platform’s restriction of access to posted material.” 
App.1711 (Doc.113 at 16). Applying that test, the court concluded that subsection 
230(c)(2) preempted the Act’s prohibition on deplatforming candidates, the Act’s 
private right of action, the Act’s requirement that platforms act consistently when 
they engage in content moderation, and the Act’s notice requirements. Id. at 15–16. 
But most of those provisions have little to do with whether a platform risks liability 
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for restricting access to material on its site and, in any event, (c)(2), the provision 
the District Court relied on exclusively to conclude the Act is preempted, does not 
field-preempt laws related to restricting access to material on the internet. Instead, it 
offers immunity from liability only when platforms remove or restrict objectionable 
material in good faith.  
Some background is helpful. Section 230 was intended to overrule a state trial-
court opinion, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), which, in contrast to S.B. 7072, had imposed liability 
on an interactive computer service for leaving user-generated content up on its 
platform rather than for taking it down. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando 
Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 & n.12 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting 
that overruling Stratton Oakmont was “the principal or perhaps the only purpose” 
expressed in the legislative history). The platform in Stratton Oakmont was treated 
as the publisher of defamatory statements that it did not remove because it had 
removed other offensive content. See 1995 WL 323710, at **3–4. In response, 
Congress provided (via subsection (c)(1)) that platforms have no affirmative duty to 
censor and clarified (via subsection (c)(2)) that they do not assume such a duty by 
undertaking certain forms of Good Samaritan content moderation. See Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Online Defamation, Legal Concepts, and the Good Samaritan, 51 VAL. 
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U. L. REV. 1, 35–39 (2016); see also Malwarebytes, Inc v. Enigma Software Grp. 
USA, LLC., 141 S. Ct. 13, 15 (2020).  
B. Consistent with this history, subsection 230(c)(2) does not endow 
platforms with broad authority “to self-regulate” free from government interference, 
as the District Court suggested. App.1709 (Doc.113 at 14). Indeed, the court cited 
no other cases locating such authority in that provision.4 Instead, (c)(2) provides a 
defense only against liability that is imposed “on account of” a platform’s “good 
faith” decision to censor certain types of content: namely, content that the platform 
“considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). That text leaves at least three 
broad areas where the Act can be applied without offending subsection 230(c)(2).  
First, and most important to this preliminary appeal, subsection 230(c)(2) 
protects only “good faith” actions. That standard is fact-specific: depending on the 
facts, platforms may act in good faith, or they may not. E.g., e-ventures Worldwide, 
LLC v. Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2210029, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017) (denying 
motion to dismiss on § 230 grounds because of dispute of fact on platform’s good 
 
4 The court cited one case locating such authority in subsection (c)(1), which 
was also incorrect, see Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997), 
and another merely holding that a particular moderation decision was in good faith, 
Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 991 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2021). In a superseding opinion, that 
court emphasized that “[o]ur decision should not be read to confer immunity on 
providers acting in circumstances far afield from the facts of this case.” Domen v. 
Vimeo, Inc., 2021 WL 3072778, at *6 (2d Cir. July 21, 2021).  
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faith); Darnaa, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2016 WL 6540452, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 
2016) (same). In the context of this pre-enforcement facial challenge, the possibility 
of such factual dispute is reason enough to reject Plaintiffs’ blunderbuss contention 
that Section 230(c)(2) preempts the Act. The tentativeness of the opinion below, 
which could go only so far as to say that good-faith discrimination against candidates 
“can happen” and that good-faith mistakes “may occur,” shows that Plaintiffs’ facial 
preemption claim fails. App.1710 (Doc. 113 at 15). 
In finding some provisions of the Act preempted despite the need for 
platforms to act in good faith to receive Section 230 protection, the District Court 
reasoned that “even a mistaken application of standards may occur in good faith.” 
Id. Perhaps, if the mistake is not pretextual. See GCM Partners, LLC v. Hipaaline 
Ltd., 2020 WL 6867207, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2020) (“mistake” might be 
pretextual). But whatever can be said about a platform’s mistakes, the District Court 
did not (and could not) determine that platforms always, or even mostly, make them 
in good faith. And when they do not, nothing in (c)(2) is inconsistent with any 
provision of the Act. So, it cannot be preempted wholesale. 
Second, subsection 230(c)(2) limits liability only for actions that “restrict 
access to or availability of material.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). But much of the Act 
does nothing of the sort. For example, the consistency provision and the notice 
requirements do not regulate content moderation at all. Platforms remain fully able 
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to remove content they believe to be obscene, lewd, etc., as long as they apply the 
same content standards to everyone and provide notice to those they censor. Put in 
terms of the text of (c)(2), the consistency and notice provisions do not seek to hold 
platforms liable for their decisions to “restrict access to or availability of material.” 
And therefore, the provisions are not preempted. 
So too with respect to deplatforming. Under the Act, “deplatform” means “to 
permanently delete or ban a user or to temporarily delete or ban a user from the social 
media platform for more than 14 days.” FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(c). Deplatforming 
thus restricts who can access a platform; it does not necessarily “restrict access to or 
availability of material” on the platform. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis 
added). Accordingly, deplatforming also falls outside the scope of (c)(2). 
Third, subsection 230(c)(2) provides immunity only when a platform removes 
content that it “considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” Read in isolation—as the District Court 
did—the word “objectionable” might arguably include all content with which a 
platform simply disagrees. But that reading cannot be right. After all, if Section 230 
meant to grant platforms immunity to remove any material whatsoever, then the 
terms “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing” would be 
surplusage. After all, if the term “objectionable” conveyed blanket censorship 
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authority, Congress would not have needed to provide specific immunity for “good 
faith” moderation of specific content. 
Instead, the statutory language must be read in context, with the phrase 
“otherwise objectionable” drawing meaning from the remainder of the list. See 
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001) (applying the ejusdem 
generis canon of interpretation); Nat’l Numismatic Certification, LLC. v. eBay, Inc., 
2008 WL 2704404, at *25 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2008). And the commonality in the list 
is that each of the preceding terms—“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing”—describe content-based categories of speech. None of (c)(2)’s 
specific speech categories is viewpoint-based, and nothing in the broader act of 
which Section 230 was a part suggests that Congress thought telecommunications 
regulations could discriminate against disfavored political viewpoints. See generally 
Adam Candeub & Eugene Volokh, Interpreting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), 1 J. OF FREE 
SPEECH L. 175, 180–86 (2021); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 
(1978) (upholding regulation of indecency in broadcast media in part because it was 
viewpoint-neutral). Accordingly, at least when platforms engage in viewpoint- 
rather than content-based censorship, the censored speech is not “otherwise 
objectionable” within the meaning of (c)(2).  
In sum, in many situations the Act can be applied consistently with subsection 
230(c)(2). True, there may be cases when, as applied, a claim under the Act is 
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inconsistent with Section 230. But that is not a proper basis for categorically 
enjoining enforcement of the Act in this facial pre-enforcement challenge. 
C. Section 230 does not preempt S.B. 7072 for an additional reason: facial 
preemption of the Act would raise serious constitutional concerns. Even if platforms 
are not state actors, federal preemption of a state statute is undoubtedly state action. 
In Railway Employees’ Department v. Hanson, the Supreme Court found that 
“justiciable questions under the First and Fifth Amendments were presented” where 
a federal statute preempted a state law entitling workers not to join a union as a 
condition of employment, since “the federal statute is the source of the power and 
authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed.” 351 U.S. 225, 231–32 
(1956). This application of the state action doctrine is reinforced by the history of 
the First Amendment, which was drafted against the backdrop “of censorship carried 
out by private organizations with complicated ties to the state apparatus and 
compelling motives to suppress speech unfavorable to the Crown.” Rossignol v. 
Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 526 (4th Cir. 2003). Section 230’s preemptive effect is 
therefore subject to First Amendment scrutiny.  
If Section 230 were read broadly to immunize online platforms from 
regulation aimed at preventing them from stifling debate in the marketplace of ideas, 
it would raise serious constitutional difficulties. Those difficulties can be avoided by 
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rejecting a capacious reading of Section 230 that would preempt the Act in every 
application. 
D. Although the District Court erred in its application of (c)(2), it was 
correct not to endorse the overbroad reading of (c)(1) that Plaintiffs proposed and 
some other courts have adopted. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102, 
1105 (9th Cir. 2009); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. Subsection (c)(1) prevents platforms 
from being “treated” as the “publisher or speaker” of the user-generated content they 
host; it does not limit the platforms’ liability for removing content. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(1). Reading (c)(1) more expansively to provide immunity for screening 
content—the subject of subsection (c)(2)—“eviscerate[s]” the narrower protection 
of subsection (c)(2) and renders it superfluous, among other problems. 
Malwarebytes, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 16 (statement of Thomas, J.); see also id. at 15–
18; e-ventures Worldwide, 2017 WL 2210029, at *3.  
II. Plaintiffs Are Unlikely To Succeed on the Merits of Their Facial First 
Amendment Challenge. 
The District Court erred in its First Amendment analysis by failing to 
separately analyze each of the specific provisions of the Act. The court below relied 
on allegations related to some provisions, mixed with case law supposedly 
applicable to others, and found the resulting mishmash sufficient to establish 
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likelihood of success on the merits.5 But the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary 
injunction, particularly one predicated on a pre-enforcement facial constitutional 
challenge, is not dispensed in gross. As both the Supreme Court and this Court have 
recognized, a party seeking to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of provisions of 
state law must show that the specific requirements that allegedly cause them 
irreparable injury are likely inconsistent with federal law. See Nat’l Inst. of Family 
& Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2370, 2376 (2018) (considering 
“licensed notice” and “unlicensed notice” requirements separately under the First 
Amendment); Wollschlaeger v. Governor, Florida, 848 F.3d 1293, 1307, 1317 (11th 
Cir. 2017) (en banc) (considering record-keeping, inquiry, and anti-harassment 
provisions apart from anti-discrimination provision under the First Amendment).  
Moreover, to invalidate a law on its face under the First Amendment, Plaintiffs 
must show (1) that “no set of circumstances exists under which [the law] would be 
valid,” or (2) that the law is overbroad, meaning that “a substantial number of its 
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep.” 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quotations omitted). To that end, 
 
5 The District Court enjoined enforcement of some provisions without even 
mentioning them. For example, the District Court never addressed Section 2(4), 
which requires disclosure of in-kind contributions that social media platforms make 
to campaigns. Nor did the District Court analyze Section 4(2)(i), which allows 
deplatformed users to access their own information for a 60-day period. The District 
Court erred in enjoining these provisions without analysis. 
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this Court’s constitutional analysis must disaggregate the Act’s specific 
requirements and analyze each on its own terms under this demanding standard. 
Once focus is directed to the specific provisions of the Act, it becomes apparent that 
Plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on the merits of their facial First Amendment 
challenge. 
The scope of this interlocutory appeal is important to the First Amendment 
analysis this Court must undertake. Although Defendants maintain that the entire 
Act is constitutional and should be upheld at final judgment, Defendants only ask in 
this appeal that the Court vacate the preliminary injunction as to certain key 
provisions of the Act. Specifically, at this stage, Defendants do not ask the Court to 
lift the preliminary injunction as to provisions of the Act that regulate so-called 
“post-prioritization.” See FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(e). The constitutionality of those 
provisions will best be assessed after discovery yields a more complete record than 
could be assembled in the limited time the District Court permitted for briefing the 
preliminary injunction. 
A. The Act’s hosting regulations do not implicate the First 
Amendment. 
Some of the Act’s most significant provisions regulate social media 
platform’s hosting function—that is, they require social media platforms to host 
certain user-generated material or else regulate how social media platforms may 
decide to remove or restrict access to user-generated material. Specifically, the Act 
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prohibits social media platforms from censoring, shadow banning, or deplatforming 
a journalistic enterprise based upon the content of its posts. FLA. STAT. 
§ 501.2041(2)(j). The Act also prohibits deplatforming candidates, id. § 106.072(2), 
and using algorithms to shadow ban posts by or about candidates during their 
campaigns, id. § 501.2041(2)(h). The platforms are free to censor, shadow ban, or 
deplatform all other users, but they may do so only in accordance with standards the 
platforms announce in advance and apply in a consistent manner, id. 
§ 501.2041(2)(a),(b). A common thread running through all these provisions is that 
they regulate the manner in which platforms decide which user-generated content to 
remove or make inaccessible. These regulations of platforms’ hosting function do 
not implicate the protections of the First Amendment for several independent 
reasons. 
1. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit the 
government from requiring social media platforms to host user 
speech.  
Analysis of the Act’s hosting regulations should begin with a recognition that 
the First Amendment does not categorically prohibit the government from requiring 
someone “to host or accommodate another speaker’s message.” FAIR, 547 U.S. at 
63. In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the Court held 
that the First Amendment was no obstacle to a California mandate that the owner of 
a shopping center allow petitioners to collect signatures and distribute handbills on 
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shopping center property—even if the shopping center had a policy against such 
expressive activity. Id. at 86–88. Reaffirming PruneYard’s central holding, in FAIR 
the Court unanimously found no First Amendment right against Congress’s mandate 
in the Solomon Amendment that law schools “afford equal access to military 
recruiters.” FAIR, 547 U.S. at 60–68. Chief Justice Roberts explained, “[a]s a general 
matter, the [law] regulates conduct, not speech. It affects what law schools must 
do—afford equal access to military recruiters—not what they may or may not say.” 
Id. at 60 (emphasis in original).  
The Act’s hosting regulations are less intrusive than the law upheld in FAIR. 
By limiting deplatforming, censorship, and shadow banning, the Act protects an 
author’s ability to post on social media platforms and for other users to affirmatively 
seek out those posts. These aspects of the law mimic the hosting obligation in FAIR, 
which allowed students who wished to affirmatively seek out military recruiters to 
do so, regardless of whether the law school agreed with what the military recruiters 
said. Like providing a table at a recruiting event, requiring that the social media posts 
of users remain accessible to those wishing to view them does not violate the First 
Amendment rights of the host. The Act’s hosting regulations require less than the 
Solomon Amendment in FAIR. After all, the Solomon Amendment required law 
schools to affirmatively speak—law schools could be required to “send e-mails or 
post notices on bulletin boards on an employer’s behalf.” FAIR, 547 U.S. at 61. The 
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same is not true of the Act’s hosting regulations, which merely require that platforms 
refrain from affirmatively squelching user posts under limited circumstances. 
The Act’s hosting regulations also parallel the Solomon Amendment in 
another respect: they not only limit the ability of platforms to exclude third-party 
speech but also ensure that once a platform is required to host speech, the platform 
cannot effectively drown out that speech or distort the message of certain speakers. 
The Solomon Amendment demanded that law schools host military recruiters, and 
that military recruiters be given the “most favorable access” granted to a nonmilitary 
recruiter. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 55. That equal access requirement prevented the law 
schools from nominally allowing the military recruiters’ access to campus, but then 
making the military recruiters inaccessible to students by, for example, shunting the 
military off to the undergraduate campus. Id. at 53. Thus, in upholding the Solomon 
Amendment in FAIR, the Supreme Court upheld both compelled hosting and rules 
to make the compelled hosting effective. The Act’s censorship and shadow banning 
protections function just the same as the equal access requirement in FAIR: they 
demand that once a platform hosts speech, the platform must also make that speech 
accessible.  
Without ever meaningfully addressing FAIR, Plaintiffs insisted, and the 
District Court agreed, that the Act is unconstitutional because it regulates editorial 
judgments akin to the constitutionally protected decisions of a newspaper about 
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which editorials to run. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 
(1974). That is, Plaintiffs argued that the Act interferes with their own speech. But 
in key respects, newspapers are unlike social media platforms making decisions 
about which users to deplatform, censor, or shadow ban. Newspapers (1) do not 
publicly disclaim responsibility for the articles they publish, (2) are highly selective 
about the material they include, (3) have limited space due to the physical product 
they produce, and (4) curate articles to create a unified speech product that conveys 
a coherent message or offers perspectives on one or more overarching themes. 
The Supreme Court’s precedents provide three guiding principles to assess 
whether speech hosting requirements impermissibly interfere with hosts’ speech: 
(i) the ability of the host to speak and dissociate from hosted speakers; (ii) the risk 
that listeners will mistakenly attribute the hosted speech to the host; and (iii) whether 
the host curates the speech of others to create its own unified speech product. All 
these principles confirm that the Act’s hosting regulations do not interfere with any 
speech by the platforms and therefore do not on their face violate the First 
Amendment. 
i. Ability to Speak 
Like the laws upheld in FAIR and Pruneyard, the hosting regulations here do 
not meaningfully “interfere[] with any message” the platforms would otherwise 
communicate. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64. As the Supreme Court explained in FAIR, 
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“[n]othing about recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any speech by 
recruiters, and nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the law schools 
may say about the military’s policies.” 547 U.S. at 65. The owner of the shopping 
center in PruneYard could likewise “expressly disavow any connection with the 
message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand.” 
447 U.S. at 87. By contrast, the same could not be said about parades, which lacked 
a “customary practice whereby private sponsors disavow any identity of viewpoint 
between themselves and the selected participants.” Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian 
and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 576 (1995) (quotation marks omitted). 
Nor was such distancing practical on the editorial page of a newspaper or in an 
envelope of a quarterly utility newsletter sent in the mail to customers. In both of 
those instances, the limitations of the host’s physical medium meant the hosted 
speech took up scarce space that “could be devoted to other material the newspaper” 
and utility operator “may have preferred to print.” FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64 (quoting 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256, and citing Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 16–18 (plurality op.)).  
The Act’s hosting regulations generally leave social media platforms free to 
speak on their own behalf and make clear their own views. Social media platforms 
are free to tell the public at large that hosted users “are communicating their own 
messages by virtue of state law.” PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87. And social media 
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platforms remain free to speak with their own voice on any issue, both on their own 
platforms and outside them. 
The ability of social media platforms to dissociate themselves from their 
users’ speech is not merely theoretical. Social media platforms have made it their 
“customary practice” to expressly disclaim responsibility for the user content they 
host. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576. Facebook states in Section 4.3 of its Terms of Service: 
“We do not control or direct what people and others do or say, and we are not 
responsible for their actions or conduct (whether online or offline) or any content 
they share (including offensive, inappropriate, obscene, unlawful, and other 
objectionable content).” App.633 (Doc.106-1 at 544). Section 3 of Twitter’s terms 
of service provides similarly: “We do not endorse, support, represent or guarantee 
the completeness, truthfulness, accuracy, or reliability of any Content or 
communications posted via the Services or endorse any opinions expressed via the 
Services . . . We may not monitor or control the Content posted via the Services and, 
we cannot take responsibility for such Content.” App.650 (Doc.106-1 at 561); see 
Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1505 (2013) (observing that 
Twitter “does not usually enjoy much First Amendment protection” because “the 
company does not . . . take responsibility for the creative choices of its users”). 
Social media platforms frequently invoke these disclaimers to obtain dismissal of 
lawsuits seeking to hold them liable for their users’ posts. E.g., Morton v. Twitter, 
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Inc., 2021 WL 1181753 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2021); Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 167 
F. Supp. 3d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 700 F. App’x 588 (9th Cir. June 6, 2017). 
And the disclaimers make explicit what every reasonable user already understands: 
the platforms do not consider themselves responsible for the content posted by their 
users.  
Unlike traditional newspapers, social media platforms, because of the 
technology they use, have in essence an unlimited ability to respond with their own 
speech to counter any hosted user speech with which they disagree. In other words, 
concerns that in some situations it is impracticable for a host to dissociate itself from 
hosted speech are nonexistent here. Compare Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576, with FAIR, 
547 U.S. at 64. Social media platforms have long disclaimed responsibility for the 
speech of their users, and the Act’s hosting regulations do nothing to prevent them 
from continuing to do so. 
ii. Risk of Listener Confusion 
The Supreme Court’s compelled speech cases also give significant weight to 
the extent to which a reasonable listener would (mis)identify the hosted speaker’s 
views with those of the host. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 65. For example, in Hurley, the 
Supreme Court found that each individual presentation in a parade would be 
“perceived by spectators as part of the whole,” such that there was a risk of 
identifying each presentation as part of the “parade’s overall message.” Id. at 576–
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77. By contrast, in PruneYard “there was little likelihood that the views of those 
engaging in the expressive activities would be identified with the owner” of the 
shopping center. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 65. Or in FAIR with the law schools hosting 
military recruiters. Id. 
There is no interference with a host’s speech when observers “can appreciate 
the difference” between speakers whom a host endorses and speakers whom a host 
“permits because legally required to do so, pursuant to an equal access policy.” 
FAIR, 547 U.S. at 65. Under the Act’s hosting regulations, a reasonable user of a 
typical social media platform would not identify the views expressed on the platform 
as those of the platform itself. As Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg explained in a 
2019 speech, his platform is focused on “giving everyone a voice” by ensuring that 
“[p]eople no longer have to rely on traditional gatekeepers in politics or media to 
make their voices heard.” App.1035 (Doc.106-2 at 50). Mr. Zuckerberg did not 
claim that all the posts that Facebook hosts are aggregated through his company’s 
content moderation practices to become Facebook’s voice. Instead, the many hosted 
voices remain distinct on the platform. And when users view this content on 
Facebook and other platforms, they are normally “apprised of the identity of the” 
speaker, Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576, by usernames and other identifying information 
signifying that it is the user, not the platform, speaking. Long before Twitter banned 
Donald Trump from its platform, even the most naïve observers understood that the 
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former President’s controversial tweets were not the speech of Twitter itself. To be 
a marketplace for the ideas of others is the very raison d’être of social media 
platforms.  
Regardless of whether a social media platform applauds or rejects the speech 
it hosts, no reasonable user thinks that the platform is the entity speaking when he 
or she views other users’ posts. Cf. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of 
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995) (rejecting misattribution fear as implausible). After 
all, “the proposition that” social media platforms “do not endorse everything they 
fail to censor is not complicated.” Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. (Dist.66) v. 
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion). And any “fear of a mistaken 
inference of endorsement” by a social media platform “is largely self-imposed, 
because” the platform “itself has control over any impressions it gives its” users. 
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 251 (plurality opinion); accord id., at 268 (Marshall, J., 
concurring in judgment).  
iii. Unified Speech Product  
Finally, in cases in which a host aggregates the speech of others, the Supreme 
Court’s compelled speech precedents place significant weight on whether a mandate 
to host a third party’s speech interferes with the host’s ability to present speech that 
“comports with” or “contribute[s] something to a common theme.” Hurley, 515 U.S. 
at 574, 576; accord FAIR, 547 U.S. at 63–64. Mandates to accommodate speech in 
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a parade, id. at 566, a utility newsletter, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n of Ca., 475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986) (plurality op.); id., at 25 (Marshall, J., 
concurring in judgment), or a newspaper, Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258, were found to 
be unconstitutional. In each instance, the hosted speech combined to form a unified 
speech product where each unit of hosted speech “affects the message conveyed,” 
thus “alter[ing] the expressive content” of the whole. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572–73. 
The analysis is different when a mandate is imposed on an entity that does not 
produce a unified speech product. Although the law schools in FAIR intended to 
“send[] the message” that they found something wrong with the military’s policies, 
the general activity involved—providing recruiting services to law students—
“lack[ed] the expressive quality of a parade, a newsletter, or the editorial page of a 
newspaper; [the school’s] accommodation of a military recruiter’s message is not 
compelled speech because the accommodation does not sufficiently interfere with 
any message of the school.” FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64–65.  
As the Supreme Court explained in Hurley, the distinction turns on whether 
“each unit’s expression . . . is perceived by spectators as part of the whole.” Hurley, 
515 U.S. at 580. Thus, when a host’s product “consists of individual, unrelated 
segments that happen to be transmitted together for individual selection by members 
of the audience,” there can be no compelled speech. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580. 
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At least generally—which is all that matters in the context of this pre-
enforcement facial challenge—social media companies cannot be said to produce a 
unified speech product like a newspaper. As “could . . . be said of recruiting in 
various law school rooms in [FAIR], or the leafleters’ and signature gatherers’ 
speech in various places at the mall in PruneYard,” the posts hosted by typical social 
media platforms are “individual, unrelated segments that happen to be [hosted] 
together.” Eugene Volokh, Treating Social Media Platforms Like Common 
Carriers?, 1 J. OF FREE SPEECH L. 377, 426 (2021). “Twitter letting people go to 
individual pages . . . , Facebook letting people go to individual Facebook pages, 
YouTube letting people view individual videos, and the like” in no way contributes 
to a “common theme” or “overall message.” Id. There is no common theme in the 
material that a social media platform merely hosts and allows users to access. Indeed, 
“[s]omething well north of 99% of the content that makes it onto a social media site 
never gets reviewed” by the platform’s employees at all, much less curated to send 
a message on behalf of the platform. App.1715 (Doc.113 at 20).  
Like the PruneYard mall but on a scale unimaginable just decades ago, social 
media platforms are “open to the public to come and go as they please.” PruneYard, 
447 U.S. at 74, 77–78, 87 (noting that the Pruneyard mall welcomed some 25,000 
patrons a day). In fact, these platforms are, “almost by definition, peculiarly public 
in nature.” Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 12 n.8; see also id. at 22 (Marshall, J., 
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concurring). And in the lively cacophony of online exchange on these platforms, 
billions of individuals discuss, post, and share unceasingly about innumerable 
topics—the only commonality is the happenstance of daily life. 
The fact that social media platforms may wish to express their disagreement 
with various speakers by declining to host them does not transform their conduct 
into a unified speech product. As in FAIR, the specific conduct these platforms use 
to deplatform, censor, or shadow ban particular users, presumably to avoid “be[ing] 
viewed as sending the message that they see nothing wrong with the [user’s 
content],” does not change the fact that the mere hosting of user-generated material 
lacks the expressive quality necessary to make this material the platform’s own 
“speech.” FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64–65. Thus, while the hosting function of social media 
platforms undoubtedly implicates vast amounts of speech protected by the First 
Amendment, it is the speech of users, not the platforms themselves. 
The District Court therefore erred in concluding the Act to be “about as 
content-based as it gets” and applying strict scrutiny to the entire law on the basis of 
provisions of the act that attach significance to the identity of the user who speaks 
on a platform or even based on the nature of the content a user may post on a 
platform, rather than focusing on whether the restrictions interfere with the 
platform’s own speech. App.1719 (Doc.113 at 24). The Court in FAIR did not 
conclude the law was content-based, even though the hosting mandate at issue gave 
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a right of access to military recruiters “and not someone else.” Id. FAIR teaches that, 
far from subjecting hosting mandates to searching constitutional scrutiny, the First 
Amendment affords the government substantial latitude in regulating the manner in 
which private entities with massive power to stifle speech in the public square may 
refuse to host speech. 
* * * 
It follows from what has been said that it would not offend the First 
Amendment for Florida to mandate that social media platforms host the speech of 
third parties. But the Act does not go that far. The Act places modest limits on social 
media platforms’ hosting function—limiting how and why platforms may remove 
or restrict users and user-generated speech—while largely leaving it to the platforms 
themselves to decide which speech to host and which content moderation policies to 
adopt. Under the Act, platforms are generally free to censor, shadow ban, and 
deplatform ordinary users for any reason, provided that they do so in accordance 
with previously announced content moderation policies and in a consistent manner. 
FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(a), (b). Journalistic enterprises can be censored, shadow 
banned, or deplatformed for reasons unrelated to the content of their speech. Id. 
§ 501.2041(2)(j). And nothing in the Act prohibits platforms from censoring 
candidates; platforms are only restricted in their ability to deplatform candidates or 
to use algorithms to shadow ban posts by or about them during their campaigns. Id. 
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§§ 106.072(2), 501.2041(2)(h). The Act’s hosting regulations thus fall comfortably 
within the scope of permissible government regulation recognized in FAIR and the 
Supreme Court’s other hosted speech precedents.  
2. The Act’s hosting regulations permissibly reflect Florida’s 
decision to treat social media platforms as common carriers.  
In issuing its preliminary injunction, the District Court failed to address the 
Florida Legislature’s determination that social media platforms should be treated as 
“common carriers.” This omission further reflects the District Court’s erroneous 
decision to not specifically analyze the Act’s individual requirements. After all, a 
firm can “operate as a common carrier with respect to a portion of its service only.” 
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 n.9 (1979). Thus, the validity of 
common carrier treatment can depend on the specific services offered by a firm and 
the specific regulations of those services. At the very least, the Act’s regulation of 
social media platforms’ hosting function permissibly treats social media platforms 
as common carriers.  
In Section 1 of the Act, the Florida Legislature found that “[s]ocial media 
platforms have become as important for conveying public opinion as public utilities 
are for supporting modern society,” and they “hold a unique place in preserving First 
Amendment protections for all Floridians and should be treated similarly to common 
carriers.” S.B. 7072 § 1(5), 1(6). In fact, “[i]n many ways, digital platforms that hold 
themselves out to the public resemble traditional common carriers.” Biden v. Knight 
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First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1224 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring). “The 
basic characteristic of common carriage is the requirement to hold oneself out to 
serve the public indiscriminately.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 740 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). And the businesses regulated by the Act generally 
hold themselves out as platforms that all the world may join.  
For centuries, companies “clothed and superinduced with a jus publicum” or 
public trust, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 12 (1894), have been subjected to 
“special regulations” on account of their public concern and at times (but not always) 
their “substantial market power.” Knight, 141 S. Ct. at 1222–23 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). While common carrier status began with those physically transporting 
wares, this doctrine was long ago extended to carriers of communications. As the 
California Supreme Court wrote in declaring a telegraph operator to be a common 
carrier, “[t]he rules of law which govern the liability of telegraph companies are not 
new. They are old rules applied to new circumstances. Such companies hold 
themselves out to the public as engaged in a particular branch of business, in which 
the interests of the public are deeply concerned.” Parks v. Alta Cal. Tel. Co., 13 Cal. 
422, 424 (1859). It was more than just these new firms’ business role that justified 
common carrier treatment. In fact, “an important motivation behind many of these 
laws, including the early ones, was the belief that they were necessary to ensure the 
unconstrained public sphere that a democratic society requires.” Genevieve Lakier, 
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The Non-First Amendment Law of Freedom of Speech, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2299, 
2319–20 (2021). 
The common law has since provided a template for legislative designation of 
certain telephonic and internet companies to be classified as common carriers. See 
Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608–09 (D.C. Cir. 1976); 
U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 710–11. In fact, an amalgam of “legislative, judicial, 
and, in a few cases, executive-branch activity has produced . . . a body of law that, 
notwithstanding the controversies that have sometimes attended its implementation, 
imposes speech-facilitating or nondiscrimination duties on virtually every 
technology of mass communication in the contemporary public sphere, with the 
important, and marked, exception of internet content providers.” Lakier, supra, 134 
HARV. L. REV. at 2330 (emphasis added). That is, until Florida’s first-of-its-kind 
consumer protection statute. “[I]t stands to reason that if Congress may demand that 
telephone companies operate as common carriers,” Florida “can ask the same of” 
social media platforms. Knight, 141 S. Ct. at 1226 (Thomas J., concurring) (quoting 
Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 684 (op. of O’Connor, J.)). 
The Florida Legislature permissibly determined that the “old rules” applicable 
to common carriers should be applied to the “new circumstances” of social media, 
in particular with respect to the platforms’ hosting function. See Parks, 13 Cal. at 
424. The social media platforms covered by the Act’s hosting regulations have 
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significant market power within their domains, and they hold themselves out to the 
public when trafficking in important public goods—namely, the speech of others. 
See Adam Candeub, Bargaining for Free Speech: Common Carriage, Network 
Neutrality, and Section 230, 22 YALE J. L. & TECH. 391, 399 (2020). Some of 
Plaintiffs’ members “have dominant market share,” and there is evidence that these 
entities’ large user bases create “substantial barriers to entry.” Knight, 141 S. Ct. at 
1224 (Thomas, J., concurring). “Certain features of digital markets—such as 
network effects, switching costs, the self-reinforcing advantages of data, and 
increasing returns to scale—make them prone to winner-take-all economics” and 
thus these markets often “‘tip’ in favor of one or two large companies.” App.212 
(Doc.106-1 at 123).  
Like telegraph and telephone lines of the past, social media platforms can 
exert “enormous control over speech.” Knight, 141 S. Ct. at 1224. This power is all 
the more significant given how important social media platforms are to 
communication in today’s America. As the Supreme Court has observed, “the vast 
democratic forums of the Internet, and social media in particular” have become “the 
most important places . . . for the exchange of views.” Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 
1735, 1743 (cleaned up). According to the Pew Research Center, 71% of Americans 
get news from social media. App.636 (Doc.106-1 at 547). It is not surprising then 
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that news publishers feel “increasingly beholden” to digital platforms. App.192 
(Doc.106-1 at 103).  
Section 230 further reinforces the reasonableness of treating social media 
platforms as common carriers. There is no doubt that Section 230 helped clear the 
path for the development of this industry—as the government did generations ago 
when it used eminent domain to help establish railroads and telegraphs. The 
recipients of this publicly conferred benefit can justifiably be regulated in serving 
all comers. 
At bottom, the Act’s hosting regulations impose the traditional obligations of 
common carriers. And the Act’s particular obligations upon platforms concerning 
candidates and journalistic enterprises—far from being evidence of content-based 
discrimination—are well within the ken of similar responsibilities placed on 
common carriers. For instance, the Act’s deplatforming and shadow banning 
limitations for candidates during the pendency of their campaigns embodies a long 
tradition of ensuring common carriers afford those aspiring to elective office “an 
opportunity to persuade others of the merits of their views.” Lakier, supra, 134 
HARV. L. REV. at 2318. Federal law has long mandated that broadcasters that host 
speech by political candidates likewise “afford equal opportunities to all other such 
candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station.” 47 U.S.C. § 315(a); 
Farmers Educ. & Co-op Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959) (holding 
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that § 315(a) does not allow broadcasters to censor even false statements); see also 
47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7), 315(b). And the viewpoint-neutral obligation to host 
journalistic enterprises is a preference with roots to the very beginning of the Nation 
itself: from the Post Office Act of 1792 until the end of congressional regulation of 
postage rates in 1970, Congress provided preferential postage rates for newspapers, 
a preference denied to many other publications. See generally Postage Rates for 
Periodicals: A Narrative History, USPS, available at https://bit.ly/38y8tnC; see also 
Lakier, supra, 134 HARV. L. REV. at 2311; Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 
154–56 (1946). 
The broad standard to serve the public indiscriminately leads to the conclusion 
that there is an “absence of any First Amendment concern” with the Act’s hosting 
regulations. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 740; see also Denver Area Educ. 
Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 739 (1996) (plurality op.) 
(noting the “relatively weak” “speech interests” of “common carriers”). After all, 
there is “the understanding that such entities, insofar as they are subject to equal 
access mandates, merely facilitate the transmission of the speech of others rather 
than engage in speech in their own right.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 741.  
3. The consistency provision is a permissible regulation of 
platforms’ conduct towards their users. 
Even if the Court rejects everything that has been said so far about the Act’s 
hosting regulations, it should still uphold the provision of the Act that requires 
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platforms to apply their pre-announced content moderation standards in a “consistent 
manner.” FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(b). This provision regulates conduct, not speech, 
because it leaves platforms free to adopt whatever rules-based content moderation 
policies they want. Suppose that a platform, like the law schools in FAIR, wished to 
ban speech in support of military recruiting. Unlike the Solomon Amendment, 
nothing in the consistency provision would prohibit such a ban. All the consistency 
provision requires is that if a social media platform creates such a rule, the platform 
must not arbitrarily ban military recruiting speech of one user but decide not to ban 
the same military recruiting speech of another. This provision thus regulates the 
manner in which social media platforms apply their content moderation policies but 
leaves the substance of those policies—and any message communicated through 
them—entirely up to the platforms themselves. 
The Supreme Court has long held that regulations of conduct generally do not 
transgress the First Amendment even when they incidentally burden speech. After 
all, “it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make 
a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, 
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.” 
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949). That social media 
platforms traffic in the speech of others does not call for an exception to this well-
established principle. Cf. Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) 
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(applying the Sherman Act to the Associated Press); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (“[W]ords can in some circumstances violate laws directed not 
against speech but against conduct”); Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502. 
Here, the consistency mandate regulates the manner in which social media 
platforms treat their users, ensuring that users who invest substantial time and 
resources in developing a social media presence cannot be arbitrarily censored, 
shadow banned, or deplatformed in violation of the platform’s own stated rules. The 
consistency mandate is indifferent to the content moderation policy the social media 
platform chooses—it does not “interfere[] with freedom to [moderate] as and how 
one’s reason or one’s interest dictates.” Assoc. Press, 564 U.S. at 20 n.18. This 
required consistency has at most an “incidental” effect on social media platforms’ 
alleged expressive conduct. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 
1144, 1150 (2017). The “primary effect” is on the platforms’ conduct toward users. 
Id. Hence, it is a constitutional regulation of conduct. Indeed, the type of conduct 
mandated by the Act—treating like users alike—is of a piece with the numerous 
anti-discrimination laws that the Supreme Court has upheld against First 
Amendment challenges. E.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984); 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 
176 (1976). 
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B. The Act’s regulation of when platforms may add an addendum to 
user posts is constitutional. 
Most of the Act’s censorship definition is just a hosting regulation—the Act 
restricts the ability of platforms to “delete, regulate, restrict, edit, alter inhibit the 
publication or republication of, suspend the right to post, [or] remove” certain user-
generated material. FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(b). The Act does, however, go further 
and regulate the ability of platforms to “post an addendum to any content” posted by 
a journalistic enterprise or other user. Id. That regulation ensures that journalists 
have meaningful access to the platform by preventing platforms from interfering 
with their speech. By posting addenda, platforms effectively distort or obstruct the 
journalist’s message, and if platforms could post endless addenda, they could black 
out the message altogether in a wall of contrary speech. The First Amendment does 
not stand in the way of preventing that kind of empty access. Consider, for example, 
if a law school responded to FAIR by having a faculty member sit in the military 
recruiter’s room and repeatedly interject with a counterpoint to every statement by 
the recruiter or loudly jeer students who met with the military for the full duration 
of the meeting such that the military recruiter could not actually communicate her 
message. That type of response (although certainly protected by the First 
Amendment outside of the military recruiter’s room) would make the requirement 
to host the military an empty one.  
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True enough, the First Amendment would not permit Florida to silence a 
platform’s own speech. But the limited restriction on appending addenda to the 
speech of others does nothing of the sort. Platforms remain free to speak in virtually 
any way they want—the only thing they cannot do is drown out a journalistic 
enterprise’s own speech. In that respect, the addendum provision mirrors a 
permissible time, place, and manner restriction: it restricts the location where a 
platform can speak while leaving open ample alternative avenues for a platform’s 
own speech. E.g., Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Corrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 121–22 (2011) 
(holding permissible a prohibition on “advocating” the passage or failure of 
legislation during a legislative debate if conflict-of-interest laws would prevent the 
legislator from voting on the matter); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 
U.S. 288, 294–98 (1984). 
C. The Act’s notice and disclosure requirements are constitutional. 
In addition to regulating platforms’ content moderation decisions, the Act also 
requires platforms to make certain disclosures about those decisions—namely, to 
disclose the rules they apply when deciding which content to censor, see FLA. STAT. 
§§ 501.2041(2)(a), (c), and to provide users with after-the-fact notice of censorship 
decisions, see id. § 501.2041(2)(d). The Act also requires that users be given, on 
request, data on the number of people who view their posts. Id.§ 501.2041(2)(e). The 
mandated disclosures require only that platforms engage in uncontroversial 
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commercial speech truthfully informing users of the services the platforms provide. 
They easily survive First Amendment scrutiny.6  
The First Amendment protects commercial speech “principally” because of 
“the value to consumers of the information such speech provides.” Zauderer v. Off. 
of Disciplinary Couns. of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). Because 
commercial speech’s value lies in its truth, the Court has permitted laws that require 
commercial speakers to disclose factually true, non-controversial information about 
their products or services. E.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 
559 U.S. 229, 248-253 (2010); Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Att’y Gen., 807 F.3d 1235, 
1250 (11th Cir. 2015).  
For example, in Zauderer, the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment 
challenge to a requirement that legal advertising disclose certain costs that clients 
might incur. See 471 U.S. at 650–53. The Court recognized the significant 
“differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech.” 
Id. at 650. The Court reasoned that disclosure requirements are substantially less 
onerous because they do not prevent businesses “from conveying information to the 
public,” but “only require[] them to provide somewhat more information than they 
 
6 The Act also prohibits platforms from changing their rules more often than 
once every 30 days. FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(c). That rule gives teeth to the other 
disclosure requirements—if platforms could change their rules endlessly, then they 
could make the requirement that consumers understand the rules meaningless by 
constantly moving the target. 
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might otherwise be inclined to present.” Id. Because a business’s interest in 
providing less truthful information to consumers is minimal, the Court concluded 
that mandatory disclosure rules are permissible if they “are reasonably related to the 
[government’s] interest in preventing deception of consumers.” Id. at 651. 
The notice requirements in the Act operate much like the notice requirements 
in Zauderer. For one, like in Zauderer, the Act targets commercial speech—
specifically, the speech that occurs when a platform solicits users to sign up for or 
keep using the platform. The large platforms regulated by the Act, see FLA. STAT. 
§ 501.2041(1)(g)(4) (outlining revenue and user thresholds), are in the business of 
gaining and keeping users; indeed, “digital platforms derive much of their value 
from network size.” Knight, 141 S. Ct. at 1224 (Thomas, J., concurring). And, to a 
large extent, users join a platform so that they can speak and consume other users’ 
speech. Accordingly, the exchange where a platform allows a user to speak on its 
site is a commercial transaction in which the platform provides the user a forum and 
in return the platform receives a user (whom the platform often markets to 
advertisers). And thus, communication about what speech the platforms will allow 
is commercial speech because it (1) proposes the terms of a commercial transaction 
with the user, (2) refers to the specific product the platform offers, and (3) arises 
from the platform’s economic motivation to enlist or retain a user. See Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983).  
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Next, just as in Zauderer, the Act addresses the risk of consumer confusion 
by demanding that platforms provide “an accurate statement” of their rules and 
content moderation decisions. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 250. And like Zauderer, the 
notices required by the Act are not controversial; they do not force the platforms to 
“convey a message fundamentally at odds” with their missions. CTIA - The Wireless 
Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 845 (9th Cir. 2019). Thus, the disclosures 
are far afield from those at issue in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. 
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018), which mandated clinics “disclose information 
about state-sponsored services.” Id. at 2372. In contrast, the Act’s notice provisions 
simply require disclosure of the platforms’ own rules and facts about their own 
content moderation decisions. These “accurate,” non-controversial disclosures, like 
the disclosures in Zauderer, are “intended to combat the problem of inherently 
misleading commercial” conduct, namely platforms enforcing content moderation 
policies that are not disclosed to consumers. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 250. At a 
minimum, the State’s determination that consumers might be misled without 
disclosure is “reasonable enough to support a requirement that information regarding 
[content moderation] be disclosed.” Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 653. Finally, as in 
Zauderer, the notice requirements do not prevent platforms “from conveying any 
additional information” they might wish to present. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 250. So 
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long as a platform complies with the Act, it can describe or discuss its moderation 
policies in whatever way it chooses. 
The District Court did not address Zauderer. Rather, it summarily enjoined 
the enforcement of each of the Act’s notice requirements because it believed “some,” 
although not all, “of the disclosure provisions seem designed not to achieve any 
governmental interest but to impose the maximum available burden on the social 
media platforms.” App.1723 (Doc.113 at 28). Even putting aside that a finding that 
some disclosure provisions are overly burdensome is not a reason to strike down all 
the provisions in all their applications, the District Court’s burden analysis was 
incorrect. Asking platforms to give information about their content moderation 
policies to consumers is not “intrinsically burdensome.” Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 653 
n.15. Indeed, many of Plaintiffs’ own members, including Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube have endorsed industry-wide calls to “provide notice to each user whose 
content is taken down or account is suspended about the reason for the removal or 
suspension” and to offer “detailed guidance to the community about what content is 
prohibited.”7 
 
7 See The Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in 
Content Moderation, https://santaclaraprinciples.org; Gennie Gebhart, Who Has 
Your Back? Censorship Edition 2019, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (June 12, 
2019), https://bit.ly/3kRhwG5. 
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D. The District Court’s remaining First Amendment grounds for 
entering the preliminary injunction lack merit. 
1. The District Court erred in concluding that the Act is 
infected with viewpoint discrimination. 
The District Court also went seriously astray when it relied on scattered 
statements in the legislative history to determine that provisions of the Act that are 
neutral on their face were enacted for an impermissible purpose in violation of the 
First Amendment. 
In United States v. O’Brien, the Supreme Court treated as content-neutral a 
prohibition against burning draft cards despite being presented with legislative 
history more provocative than anything present here. See Br. for David Paul O’Brien 
at 16–21, United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Nos. 232, 233) (quoting 
legislator statements that the law was needed to counteract “Beatniks,” “mobs of so-
called ‘students,’ ” and “Communist ‘stooges’ ”). In refusing to treat legislative 
history as a basis for deeming the law to be content based, the Court explained that 
“[w]hat motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily 
what motivates scores of others to enact it.” 391 U.S. at 384. Similarly, the Court in 
Frisby v. Shultz upheld a ban on residential picketing, 487 U.S. 474, 476 (1988), 
even though it was “enacted in response to the activities of antiabortion protestors 
who wanted to protest at the home of a particular doctor to persuade him and others 
that they viewed his practice of performing abortions to be murder.” Hill v. 
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Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725 (2000); see also Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“We are governed by laws, not by 
the intentions of legislators.”). 
This Court’s precedents are even clearer in rejecting the use of legislative 
history to impute a content-discriminatory intent to laws that are neutral on their 
face: “when a statute is facially constitutional, a plaintiff cannot bring a free-speech 
challenge by claiming that the lawmakers who passed it acted with a constitutionally 
impermissible purpose.” In re Hubbard, 803 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2015); see 
also Artistic Ent., Inc. v. City of Warner Robins, 223 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 
2000); Int’l Food & Beverage Sys. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 794 F.2d 1520, 1525 
(11th Cir. 1986). In First Amendment cases, “[t]he plain meaning of the text 
controls, and the legislature’s specific motivation for passing a law is not relevant, 
so long as the provision is neutral on its face.” Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, 
545 F.3d 685, 691 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (cleaned up). 
The District Court’s opinion exemplifies the “hazard[s]” of applying the First 
Amendment based on a legislature’s perceived “motives or purposes.” O’Brien, 391 
U.S. at 383. The District Court agreed with Plaintiffs that “the actual motivation for 
[the Act] was hostility to the social media platforms’ perceived liberal viewpoint,” 
App.1719 (Doc.113 at 24), and based its conclusions on this ground. Yet the Act’s 
legislative findings and substantive provisions are scrupulously neutral with respect 
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to political viewpoint. The findings speak of “protect[ing] Floridians”—all of 
them—and the Act does so regardless of the views they wish to express. S.B. 7072 
§ 1(11). Florida did not lose its “undoubted power” to adopt S.B. 7072 simply 
because a lawmaker failed to make what the District Court might have considered 
“a ‘wiser’ speech.” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 384. 
2. The District Court erred when it concluded that the Act 
impermissibly targets large companies. 
The District Court also concluded that, coupled with legislative remarks, the 
“statutory definition of ‘social media platform’ ” suggests an intent to discriminate 
against “large entities.” App.1720 (Doc.113 at 25); see also supra n.1. To the extent 
the court’s statements in this regard imply an equal-protection violation, they are 
entirely dicta: Plaintiffs did not seek a preliminary injunction based on their equal-
protection claim. 
Nor is the statutory definition “sufficient, standing alone, to subject these 
statutes to strict scrutiny” under the First Amendment. App.1721 (Doc.113 at 26). 
In the two cases the District Court cited for that proposition, the challenged laws 
applied to a small handful of entities—in contrast to the several that meet the Act’s 
definition of “social media platform,” as seen in Plaintiffs’ memberships alone. 
Compare Minn. Star & Trib. Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591 
n.15 (1983) (only two Minnesota newspaper publishers paid significant taxes under 
the challenged law), and, Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 
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n.4 (1987) (only one to three Arkansas magazines paid the challenged tax), with 
App.34 (Doc.1) ¶ 20 n.23 (Plaintiffs’ member entities allegedly subject to the Act). 
More importantly, neither Minneapolis Star nor Arkansas Writers’ Project used 
strict scrutiny solely because the challenged laws applied to limited entities, but 
because this “differential treatment . . . suggest[ed] that the goal of the regulation 
[was] not unrelated to suppression of expression.” Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 
460 U.S. at 585; see Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc., 481 U.S. at 229 (“[A] magazine’s 
tax status [under the challenged law] depends entirely on its content.”). These two 
cases are therefore relevant only in their refusal to do what the District Court did 
here: “impugn the motives” of the legislature that passed the challenged law. 
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 592.8  
III. Any Provisions of the Act that Might Be Preempted or Unconstitutional 
Are Severable. 
 
The Act’s severability clause provides that  
 
If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or 
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other 
provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect without 
 
8 The District Court also erred in concluding that the Act could not survive 
intermediate scrutiny under Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
Since that argument depends on an evidentiary record that Defendants were not 
permitted to develop below, we do not raise that specific issue in this appeal. 
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the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of 
this act are declared severable. 
 
S.B. 7072 § 6 (emphasis added). The “cardinal principle of severability analysis” for 
Florida statutes is that “[t]he severability of a statutory provision is determined by 
its relation to the overall legislative intent of the statute of which it is a part, and 
whether the statute, less the invalid provisions, can still accomplish this intent.” 
Emerson v. Hillsborough Cnty., 312 So. 3d 451, 460 (Fla. 2021) (quotation marks 
omitted; emphasis in original). Even in the absence of a severability clause, the 
“burden” is “on the challenging party to establish that the measure is not severable.” 
Id. (quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). 
 Here, the “overall legislative intent of the statute” is to preserve the speech 
rights of social media users. The Act’s provisions can “accomplish this intent” 
independently of one another. For example, if the Act’s regulation of the ability of a 
platform to add an addendum to user posts were unconstitutional, only that portion 
of the Act’s definition of “censor” should be severed from the remainder of the 
definition. The resulting statute might not accomplish the legislature’s goals as fully 
as intended, but the legislature also intended that the “invalidity” of some provisions 
“shall not effect other provisions” that still “can be given effect.” S.B. 7072 § 6. 
 The District Court mentioned severability only briefly, in discussing the Act’s 
“exclusion for social-media providers under common ownership with a large Florida 
theme park.” App.1721 (Doc.113 at 26) (discussing § 501.2041(1)(g)(4)). The court 
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thought it “at least questionable” that, to the extent this exclusion creates First 
Amendment issues, it would be severable given that “the Legislature adopted it” 
despite those issues. Id. But that is of course true in any severability case. In this 
case, the legislature also adopted a provision asking courts to sever any invalid 
provision. And it is no “stretch to say the severability clause allows a court to impose 
[the Act’s] burdens on the statutorily excluded entities”—in other words, to level up 
rather than level down protections for social media users. Id. That is exactly what 
the Supreme Court did in Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 
2335, 2343 (2020) (plurality op.) (invalidating an exception from a robocall 
restriction as content-based and severing it rather than invalidating the entire 
restriction).  
The District Court’s decision to enjoin enforcement of §§ 106.072 and 
501.2041 on account of certain provisions, and refusal to consider those provisions 
severable from the rest of the Act, was therefore another error. If Plaintiffs’ facial 
preemption and First Amendment claims were likely to succeed against any 
particular provisions, those claims would support at most only a partial injunction. 
IV. Plaintiffs Lack All Other Prerequisites for a Preliminary Injunction. 
Plaintiffs’ failure to show a likelihood of success against the relevant 
provisions is fatal by itself. See Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1242 (11th Cir. 
2011). Yet even if they had, “[a] showing of irreparable injury is the sine qua non of 
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injunctive relief,” and Plaintiffs have failed to show it. Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176 
(quotation marks omitted). The provisions at issue pose no danger to Plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment rights. Plaintiffs may still monitor their platforms while applying 
content standards in a consistent manner, generating notices when screening certain 
user content, and complying with the Act’s other provisions.  
The remaining factors “merge when . . . the government is the opposing 
party.” Gonzalez, 978 F.3d at 1271 (cleaned up). Both favor the State here. The State 
is irreparably injured when its laws are enjoined. See Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 
1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers). And the public suffers an irreparable 
injury in the absence of the Act’s protections against platforms’ well-documented 
discrimination against disfavored speakers. Whatever burdens Plaintiffs might bear 
are far exceeded by the public benefits of free expression from political candidates, 
journalistic enterprises, and ordinary Floridians of all stripes. 
CONCLUSION 
Apart from the portions of the preliminary injunction that prohibit 
enforcement of the Act’s regulation of “post-prioritization,” the preliminary 
injunction should be reversed. 
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